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Abstract—Accurate and reliable information sharing is essen-
tial in the healthcare domain. Currently, however, information
about individual patients is held in isolated medical records main-
tained by numerous separate healthcare providers. Accurately
linking this information is necessary for planned nationwide
Electronic Health Record systems, but this must be done in
a way that not only satisfies traditional data confidentiality
requirements, but also meets patients’ personal privacy needs.
Here we present an architecture for linking electronic medical
records in a way that gives patients control over what information
is revealed about them. This is done through the use of indirect
pseudonym identifiers. We then explain how this architecture can
be implemented using existing technologies. A case study is used
to show how our architecture satisfies data accuracy needs and
patients’ privacy requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information is a valuable asset in any business domain, but
this is especially so in healthcare where there is a wealth of
medical data that is essential to patients’ medical diagnoses
and can benefit medical research. Unfortunately, medical in-
formation about a particular individual is currently maintained
by numerous different healthcare providers, and is stored in
isolated databases in various incompatible formats [6]. There
is thus a strong political imperative in many countries to link
this data to create nationwide Electronic Health Record (EHR)
systems [7].
Aggregating data in this way raises significant security
concerns, since it links information that was previously kept
separate and it creates single points of failure for access
control. In addition, the highly personal nature of medical
information means that we must pay particular attention to
patient privacy. Whereas traditional data confidentiality mech-
anisms aim to give the owner of information control over its
accessibility, privacy means giving the subject of information
control over who accesses it. Thus, even though Electronic
Health Records will be administered and maintained by gov-
ernment authorities, the patients who are the subject of the
records must have (at least partial) control over who may see
them [5].
In particular, establishing an Electronic Health Record sys-
tem introduces the problem of linking the information already
accumulated about each patient, and possibly their relatives,
in isolated databases. This information may go back several
decades, may be dispersed across a wide geographic area, and
may be hosted by numerous different medical providers [20].
Typically these isolated medical records will lack a common
unique identifier, sometimes even making it difficult to tell if
they belong to the same individual.
This situation means that the creation of Electronic Health
Record systems is hindered by three distinct privacy issues:
• The need to link only those records belonging to the same
patient. Since legacy medical records lack a common
identifier it will often be necessary to link them via other
identifying data, such as name, date of birth, gender, and
address. However, even this may not be sufficient because
this data may be incomplete, out of date, or inaccurate due
to data entry errors [3], [20]. Offering patients the ability
to inspect records, to help decide whether they should be
linked or not, introduces additional privacy concerns by
allowing, for instance, a patient to see a medical record
belonging to another patient with the same name.
• The need to allow patients to keep certain linkages pri-
vate. Personal privacy concerns may introduce a desire on
a patient’s part not to link certain records. For example,
a patient might not be willing to reveal the existence of
certain medical records at specific healthcare providers
(e.g. abortion or drugs addiction clinics). For a patient to
successfully hide the fact that they have attended a certain
medical institution in the past, even the patient identifiers
used within that institution must not be revealed. (Not
allowing patients to hide information is not an acceptable
solution, because patients will resort to falsifying data to
preserve their privacy, thus affecting the integrity of the
medical records.)
• The need to override privacy rules in special circum-
stances. Despite the patients’ privacy wishes, there are sit-
uations where access must be granted to all of a patient’s
medical data, typically in life-threatening emergencies.
In this paper we define an architecture for maintaining pa-
tient identifiers that satisfies all of the above security needs. We
are interested in the scenario where the patient has more than
one Electronic Medical Record (EMR) at different healthcare
providers, each containing certain medical data, some of which
are sensitive and some are not. We want to link these EMRs to
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allow them to be aggregated to form a single Electronic Health
Record for viewing by authorized healthcare providers, but do
so in a way that protects the patient’s privacy wishes.
II. BACKGROUND
Individual Electronic Medical Records represent observa-
tions of patients taken by a particular healthcare provider.
These records contain some attributes identifying a patient
(e.g. name, address, age and gender). Each EMR normally has
a unique identifier within the healthcare provider’s database
that determines the patient’s identity. The goal of an Electronic
Health Record system is to aggregate the EMRs concerning a
particular patient to provide a complete medical history of the
patient [6].
Currently, there are ongoing Electronic Health Record
projects in several countries—including Australia, the United
Kingdom and the USA—which aim to provide a national
EHR for each patient. Each EHR will contain several aspects
from the patient’s distributed medical records [7]. To achieve
this objective, a unique identifier could be used among all
the Electronic Medical Record systems, making the patient
identifiable in all databases via a single identifier. However,
implementation of this proposal is seen as difficult and it
will take several years due to the the severe data format
interoperability problems in healthcare [6].
Furthermore, it is considered poor security practice to use
the same user identifier for several digital services due to
the security impact that compromising this identifier will
have upon the associated services [15]. Therefore, having a
single patient identifier for all healthcare providers may not
be acceptable due to the security risks it poses. In particular,
having a unique identifier may violate patients’ privacy wishes
because patients often see advantages in maintaining several
distinct identities [4].
Therefore, we need a way to access and aggregate the
patient’s distributed Electronic Medical Records while at the
same time ensuring that the patient’s privacy concerns are
satisfied [3]. In order to have a successful EMR linking
process, we need to consider the following requirements [3]:
1) The patient’s federated Electronic Health Record must
be constructed in a secure and an accurate way. For
instance, the records of two different ‘John Smiths’
should not be accidently merged.
2) Patients’ local identities (within each healthcare
provider) should not be disclosed to any external party.
3) Patients should be the only individuals who know about
the location of their EMRs.
Accurately linking a large number of legacy Electronic
Medical Records, for a large patient population, while preserv-
ing each patient’s privacy, is a daunting task [3], [5]. To date
there have been two basic approaches to creating federated
patient identities, manual and automated.
As an example of a manual approach, a Western Australian
Data Linkage system [11] has been developed to link patients’
medical records and was used in a project designed to study
diabetes in the Western Australian population. This system
uses secure electronic data links with healthcare providers for
transmitting patients’ EMRs. The record linkage process was
accomplished by a small team specializing in data matching,
using the patient’s identifying personal data but without having
access to the corresponding medical data or the identity of the
information provider. This laborious manual linkage process
was performed once only, when the system was established.
Although sufficient for the purposes of this one-time medical
research project, such an approach is insufficient for ongoing
medical diagnostic purposes for the following reasons:
• The reliability and accuracy of patient’s identities and
data are essential for medical diagnosis. By excluding
the patient from the linking process, this approach fails
to use the best available source of knowledge of a
patient’s past medical history. (Accurate linking is not
so critical for research purposes, which are normally
concerned with average population characteristics, not
those of individuals.)
• The patient does not have any sort of control over this
linkage process since the healthcare authority is the one
who controls the way information is linked.
• Because the process is centralised it is highly labour
intensive and difficult to maintain over time.
Record linkage has also been attempted by automatic means.
For instance, probabilistic matching algorithms [12] have been
used to do a syntactic analysis of records for the sake of
determining whether these records are related or not. These
records are also analyzed by a third party, e.g. matching
experts [9] or matching systems [8], who may use a clear text
representation of the patient’s identity data or an encrypted
version [3], [8]. These records can be transmitted to the third
party in a secure way, e.g. through a proxy [2], which helps
hide the source of the records. Automated matching processes
usually result in one of the following outcomes: full match,
possible match or non-match. As per Requirement 1 above, a
‘possible’ link is not acceptable as we need an accurate linking
process for medical diagnosis. Also, linking patients’ EMRs
using their identity data may breach the privacy requirement
stated in Requirement 2. Therefore, using third party matching
or probabilistic matching methods are not considered adequate
for EMR linking.
III. RELATED WORK
Instead, it is preferable that the patient should play a major
role in the EMR linking process, since patients are aware
of their own medical history, previous places of residence,
etc. The EMR linking process could be achieved by linking
the patient’s ‘local’ identities at each healthcare provider in a
secure way that satisfies the three stated requirements above.
Existing Federated Identity Management (FIM) techniques
[10], [16] define how to allow users to make a link between
local identities by creating a federated pseudonym identifier.
The FIM architecture [13], [14] determines a set of interactions
between an Identity Provider (IdP) and a Service Provider
(SP) to facilitate several services such as single sign-on,
attribute exchange and account linking. An Identity Provider
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is an entity that authenticates users and produces assertions of
authentication and attribute assertion in accordance with the
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) Assertion and
Protocol specification [19]. A Service Provider is an entity
that provides web-based services to users. An entity can play
the role of either an IdP or SP, or both. In our application,
a healthcare provider typically plays both roles, an IdP to
provide authentication for the users of the Electronic Medical
Record System and a SP in providing access to the patients’
EMRs.
Using this approach, patients could link their local identities
at different healthcare providers, as long as these healthcare
providers are in a trust agreement [21]. The result of this
linking process would be a new link between the patient’s
Electronic Medical Records. The identity linking process could
be accomplished by using a federated pseudonym identifier
which is associated with each local identity. This pseudonym
identifier would serve as a reference for the patient [13], [16]
to be used when these healthcare providers want to exchange
any information about the patient. Using Federated Identity
Management, patients could thus link their EMRs in an
accurate and secure way. Unfortunately, however, this process
fails to satisfy Requirement 3 above. Here, each healthcare
provider would know that the patient maintains an EMR at
the other healthcare provider that shares the same pseudonym
identifier. In addition, the patient might need to create several
federated accounts in order to link identities at each healthcare
provider, resulting in a complex federated identity network that
will be difficult for patients to manage.
Overall, none of the existing techniques for Federated
Identity Management is ideal for healthcare record linkage
applications, since they do not pay sufficient heed to the
significant privacy considerations associated with personal
medical information. Our goal below, therefore, is to show
how the necessary levels of security and privacy for Electronic
Medical Record linkage can be achieved by adapting existing
technologies.
IV. AN ARCHITECTURE FOR EHR IDENTITY
MANAGEMENT
Although Federated Identity Management cannot provide a
link between the patients’ local identities in a way that satisfies
each patient’s privacy wishes, we show here that the federation
mechanism can be extended to provide a solution to this
problem. We extend the Identity Providers’ role to include an
identity linkage service for all of the patient’s local identities
and to act as an intermediary for connections between the
healthcare providers. To do this, the architecture consists of
four functions: Identity Linkage, Access Control, Auditing and
Record Aggregation (Figure 1).
A. Identity Linkage Function
The Identity Linkage function is the core component of the
Electronic Health Record system’s identity management archi-
tecture. It provides two services: authentication and identity
linkage. In the authentication process, the Identity Linkage
function authenticates the patient’s access to the EHR system
and it provides the patient with a single sign-on service which
allows access to those healthcare providers’ systems that are in
the federation agreement. The Identity Linkage service allows
patients to selectively connect Electronic Medical Records to
their Electronic Health Record by linking the associated EMR
identities. It does this by creating and maintaining a relation
between the patient’s primary EHR identity and the secondary
EMR identities used by each healthcare provider.
B. Access Control Function
Expressing the patient’s access control wishes and enforcing
only legitimate uses of the patient’s Electronic Health Record
are crucial requirements in an EHR system [17]. In our
architecture, the Access Control function is responsible for
evaluating all access requests as per the access control policies
set by the patient and the medical authority. Here, patients set
their privacy wishes by selecting appropriate access control
policies, while the medical authority ensures legitimate uses of
the EHR by setting adequate access control policies to ensure
that medical practitioners have access to the information that
is required for their current role, which includes ‘overriding’
access to the patient’s complete EHR in emergencies.
C. Auditing Function
The Auditing function registers (logs) all user requests
and activities that occur within the Electronic Health Record
system (e.g. EHR access requests, EHR reply messages, etc).
This accumulated data can be analyzed to detect users who are
misusing the system, and can be used as a source of evidence
when investigating security violations. Such a capability is
essential for engendering a sense of trust in the legitimate
users of the system.
D. Record Aggregation Function
Current Electronic Medical Record systems lack a unified
EMR schema and a common semantics. Therefore, the EHR
system’s Record Aggregation function is responsible for nor-
malizing the received EMRs and aggregating them in way
that preserves data integrity and produces a comprehensive
and consistent Electronic Health Record. Furthermore, data
aggregation risks creating unintended channels of information
flow, by creating links between otherwise separate pieces of
information.
Solving the data integrity and information flow problems
requires a semantic knowledge of the Electronic Medical
Records that are used to compose the Electronic Health
Record. This is beyond the scope of this paper, but we note
that the issue is being partially addressed at present by new
standard ‘archetypes’ for medical records [1].
V. THE PROTOCOLS
To understand how the functions proposed in Section IV
work in concert, this section describes the message protocols
used by the Electronic Health Record system to process and
respond to requests. The key protocols are an identity linkage
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Fig. 1. The proposed EHR Identity Management and Access Control architecture
protocol, an EHR request protocol, an EHR construction
protocol and an EHR response protocol.
A. Identity Linkage Protocol
We assume that the patient has been assigned a prime
identity IDP by the Identity Linkage function, and has
identities ID1 and ID2 that are maintained respectively at
Healthcare Provider 1 and Healthcare Provider 2. Also, we
assume that the Electronic Health Record system and each
healthcare provider has a PKI key pair which is used in
the identification process. We further assume that the EHR
system has a trust and a federation agreement with the two
healthcare providers and that it maintains a list of participating
healthcare providers. The following steps then detail how a
patient links his Electronic Health Record to the Electronic
Medical Records kept by the two healthcare providers by
linking to their ‘local’ identities ID1 and ID2:
1) The patient logs in to the Electronic Health Record
system using his prime identity IDP .
2) The Identity Linkage function authenticates the patient.
3) The patient asks to create a link to his Electronic
Medical Record at a specific healthcare provider.
4) The Identity Linkage function responds with a list that
has all the participating healthcare providers in the
federation.
5) The patient selects his targeted healthcare provider link,
e.g. Healthcare Provider 1.
6) The Identity Linkage function redirects the patient’s
browser to Healthcare Provider 1’s system.
7) Healthcare Provider 1’s system requests authentication
from the patient.
8) The patient logs in using his local identity ID1.
9) Healthcare Provider 1 authenticates the patient.
10) The Identity Linkage function generates a unique
pseudonym identifier IDS1 that serves as a reference
identity that both Healthcare Provider 1 and the Identity
Linkage function will use for this patient when commu-
nicating with each other.
11) The Identity Linkage function sends new pseudonym
identifier IDS1 to Healthcare Provider 1 to be associated
with the patient’s local identity ID1.
12) The Identity Linkage function updates the audit log
server with this linking process.
13) To link to the second local identity ID2, the patient
needs to redo Steps 3 to 12, by selecting Healthcare
Provider 2 this time.
Once the patient has linked all of his local identities to the
prime identity in this way, we will end up with an identity
tree created at the Identity Linkage function. The root for this
tree is the patient’s prime identity IDP and the leaves are
the pseudonym identifiers IDS1 and IDS2 that are created as
per the patient’s linking requests. Each pseudonym identifier is
shared with a specific healthcare provider. Once the healthcare
provider has associated the pseudonym identifier with the
patient’s local identity, it will use it for any future requests
involving this patient’s Electronic Health Record.
B. EHR Request Protocol
We assume here that a medical practitioner who is working
with Healthcare Provider 1 requests an Electronic Health
Record for the patient with (local) identity ID1. The following
steps show how this request is made by Healthcare Provider 1’s
system:
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1) The medical practitioner logs in to Healthcare
Provider 1’s Electronic Medical Record system.
2) The healthcare provider’s system authenticates the med-
ical practitioner.
3) The medical practitioner initiates a request for patient
ID1’s Electronic Health Record.
4) Healthcare Provider 1’s EMR system replaces the pa-
tient’s local identity ID1 with its associated pseudonym
identifier IDS1.
5) The request is digitally signed by Healthcare
Provider 1’s PKI key.
6) The request is forwarded to the Electronic Health Record
system.
In these steps, note that the Electronic Health Record
request is made using the patient’s local pseudonym identifier
which does not reveal any information about the patient’s
local identity ID1 to the EHR system. Therefore, the patient’s
privacy Requirement 2 in Section II is satisfied.
Once this request is received by the Electronic Health
Record system, the following steps are executed:
1) The EHR system verifies the digital signature of the
received EHR request.
2) A log of this EHR request is sent to the audit log server.
3) The EHR request is forwarded to the Access Control
function [18] which does the following steps (Figure 2):
a) The EHR request is sent to the Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP).
b) The PEP obtains SAML Assertions containing
information about the requester (e.g. name, medical
role, time and location).
c) The PEP obtains the prime identity of the received
pseudonym IDS1 by a ‘prime identity resolve’
request made to the Identity Linkage function (i.e.
IDP ).
d) The PEP presents all the information to a Policy
Decision Point (PDP) to decide if access should be
allowed.
e) The PDP obtains all the policies (that were set by
the patient and the medical authority) relevant to
the request and evaluates them.
f) The PDP informs the PEP of the decision result.
g) The PEP enforces the decision by either sending a
request to the identity linkage function to construct
the EHR for the prime identity IDP in accordance
to the access control policies or by indicating that
access is not allowed.
By using the EHR request protocol, the medical practitioner
is able to request the patient’s Electronic Health Record
without the need to know the location of its component
Electronic Medical Records. In addition, the patient’s local
identity has not been disclosed to any other party, satisfying
the patient’s identity privacy requirements in Section II.
C. EHR Construction Protocol
Once the Identity Linkage function receives an Electronic
Health Record request from the Policy Enforcement Point, the
following steps are carried out:
1) As per the access control policy, the Identity Link-
age function determines the location of the permitted
Electronic Medical Records by finding the associated
pseudonym identifiers (i.e. IDS2).
2) The Identity Linkage function creates an Electronic
Medical Record request using the patient’s pseudonym
identifier IDS2, and this request is digitally signed by
the EHR system’s PKI key.
3) The request is sent to Healthcare Provider 2’s EMR
system.
4) Healthcare Provider 2’s EMR system matches
pseudonym identifier IDS2 to the corresponding
local identity ID2.
5) Healthcare Provider 2’s EMR system processes this
request as per its local access control policies.
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6) Healthcare Provider 2’s system retrieves the EMR and
replaces the patient’s local identity ID2 with the asso-
ciated pseudonym identifier IDS2.
7) The resulting EMR is digitally signed with Healthcare
Provider 2’s PKI key and then sent to the EHR system.
8) The EHR Aggregation function receives the signed
EMR(s) and constructs an appropriate Electronic Health
Record for this patient.
In these steps, the EMR request sent to the healthcare
provider does not reveal anything about the requester, thus
hiding the fact that the patient has an Electronic Medical
Record at the requester’s clinic. Also, all the EMRs that are
received by the EHR aggregation function belong to the same
patient, so the resulting EHR is an accurate summary of the
patient’s EMRs. Therefore, we note that the patient’s privacy
concerns in Section II are satisfied here as well.
D. EHR Response Protocol
Once the Electronic Health Record is produced by the EHR
Aggregation function, the resulting EHR is sent to the medical
practitioner as per the following steps:
1) The EHR system replaces the patient’s prime identity
IDP with the associated pseudonym identifier IDS1 at
the requester’s side.
2) The Electronic Health Record is digitally signed by the
EHR system before sending it to Healthcare Provider 1.
3) This action is recorded by sending a message to the audit
log server.
4) Healthcare Provider 1’s system receives the EHR and
converts the pseudonym identifier IDS1 to its associated
local identity ID1.
5) Healthcare Provider 1’s system makes the aggregated
Electronic Health Record available to the medical prac-
titioner.
Notice from the whole EHR request process that the medical
practitioner has received the patient’s EHR as a result of an
accurate linking and aggregating of the patient’s distributed
EMRs, because the original linkage process was done by the
patient. Also, the medical practitioner does not know from
where this information has been gathered, so cannot make
any inferences about the patient’s medical history (e.g. atten-
dance at drugs rehabilitation clinics) beyond the information
explicitly contained in the Electronic Health Record.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we briefly explain how the proposed identity
management function for Electronic Health Records could be
implemented using existing technologies.
A. Identity Linkage Function
This function handles three processes: authentication, iden-
tity federation and maintaining the identity tree. It was men-
tioned in Section IV that the Identity Linkage function plays
the role of Identity Provider, as defined in Federated Identity
Management, but with additional responsibilities.
Implementing an Identity Linkage server (infrastructure
software) and the participating healthcare identity servers
can be done using the well-established Identity Federation
Framework (ID-FF) from the Liberty Alliance project, which
enables identity linking through the use of a Name Registra-
tion Protocol, and which has mature protocols to handle the
processes needed in a federation network [13].
The patient’s identity tree, which holds links between the
prime identity and its associated pseudonym identities, is
implemented easily in a relational database, by creating a
table to store all the identities (prime and pseudonym). The
prime identity will be the primary key for this table as it links
the different pseudonym identifiers. Thus, it will be easy to
allocate the prime identity for any pseudonym identifier and it
will be easy to retrieve the pseudonym identifiers associated
with a specific prime identity.
B. Access Control Function
For expressing and evaluating access control policies, the
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), a
well-established OASIS standard, can be used [18]. The mes-
sages exchanged between the EHR system and the participat-
ing healthcare providers can be based on the protocols that are
presented in the Security Assertion Markup Language [19].
The SAML standard defines a framework for exchanging
security information between online business partners. Fur-
thermore, the SAML and XACML specifications contain some
features (e.g. XACML Attribute Profile, SAML 2.0 profile
of XACML) specifically designed to facilitate their combined
use, thus making them ideal for the EHR application [19].
VII. CASE STUDY
In this section we use a case study to illustrate how our
architecture solves the problem of linking several EMRs that
do not share a common identity. Also, we highlight some
of a patient’s privacy wishes that must be respected when
constructing the patient’s Electronic Health Record.
The illustrative scenario is as follows:
Patient Frank has four Electronic Medical Records hosted
by two General Practitioners’ clinics, a hospital and a drug
addiction clinic as shown in Figure 1. Frank has three sen-
sitive health records, mental health, sexual issues and drug
addiction. Frank prefers to go to GP Tony for his sexual
illness issue, where his identity is ‘FrankT’. Also, he prefers
to visit GP Karen for his mental illness issue, where his
identity is ‘FrankK’. In the drugs addiction clinic, Frank’s
identity is ‘FrankA’. Frank is embarrassed by all of these
records and does not want anyone to know about them,
unless he specifically gives permission. Also, Frank has a
general medical record that is maintained by a hospital. This
medical record was created when he visited the hospital’s ER
(Emergency Room) after an accident, and uses ‘FrankH’ as
his identity. Frank does not mind if anyone sees this record.
Frank wants to restrict access to his medical records by setting
the following access control rules:
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1) Tony is allowed to retrieve Frank’s health record from
the hospital using his local identity FrankT. However,
Tony should not know anything about the source of the
aggregated medical records.
2) Karen is allowed to retrieve and aggregate the infor-
mation contained in Frank’s health records at the drugs
addiction clinic and at the hospital. Karen should do this
process using Frank’s local identity FrankK. However,
she should not know anything about the sources of the
aggregated medical records.
In addition to these rules, the medical authority wishes to
allow any medical practitioner to have unrestricted access to
any patients’ health record in emergencies.
In the following sections, we show how Frank can link his
separate Electronic Medical Records, how Frank can set his
privacy wishes, how GP Karen can request and receive Frank’s
Electronic Health Record, and how an ER medical practitioner
can access Frank’s EHR in an emergency.
A. EMR Linking Process
This process starts by registering Frank at the Electronic
Health Record system. We assume that the EHR system is
hosted and administered by the government’s medical author-
ity. As a result of the registration process, Frank will be
assigned a prime identity ‘FrankP’. Tony’s clinic, Karen’s
clinic, the drugs addiction clinic and the hospital are all trusted
participants with the EHR system.
Now assume that Frank wants to link his various Electronic
Medical Records so that an appropriate Electronic Health
Record can be constructed, when requested by an authorized
medical practitioner, in a way that respects his privacy wishes.
The linking process will go through the following steps as
illustrated in Figure 3:
1) Frank accesses the Electronic Health Record system
using his prime identity FrankP.
2) The EHR system authenticates Frank.
3) Frank asks to link his Electronic Medical Records.
4) The EHR system responds with the participating health-
care providers list.
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5) Frank chooses to link his EMR at Tony’s clinic.
6) The EHR system redirects Frank’s browser to Tony’s
clinic’s EMR system.
7) Frank enters his identity that is maintained at Tony’s
clinic, i.e. FrankT.
8) The EHR system generates a pseudonym identifier
FrankS1, adds it to Frank’s identity tree, and sends
this identity to Tony’s clinic’s system to associate with
Frank’s local identity FrankT.
9) A completion message is exchanged between the EHR
system and Tony’s clinic’s EMR system.
10) The Identity Linkage function sends the audit log server
details of this linking process.
11) Frank is informed that the linking process is completed.
To create links to the other EMRs at Karen’s clinic, the
drugs addiction clinic and the hospital, the above process needs
to be repeated with the other healthcare providers. As a result
of linking all the EMRs, Frank’s prime identity FrankP is
associated with pseudonym identifiers FrankS1, FrankS2,
FrankS3 and FrankS4 within the EHR system.
Also, we will have the following identity associations at the
healthcare providers:
• At Tony’s clinic: FrankS1 is associated with FrankT.
• At Karen’s clinic: FrankS2 is associated with FrankK.
• At the drugs addiction clinic: FrankS3 is associated with
FrankA.
• At the hospital: FrankS4 is associated with FrankH.
B. Setting Access Control Policies
Frank uses the Access Control function to set his access
control policies to meet his privacy wishes. The access control
policy in the EHR system is expressed through the following
sentence:
In a certain access context the subject is
authorized to construct an Electronic Health Record
from the identities ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn, but
is prohibited from accessing the fields field1,
field2, . . . , fieldn.
To express Frank’s access control rules, and the medical
authority’s emergency access policy, the following access
control policies will be created:
1) Under a Normal access scenario, Tony is authorized to
construct the EHR via the identity FrankS4.
2) Under a Normal access scenario, Karen is authorized
to construct the EHR via the identities FrankS3 and
Frank4.
3) Under an Emergency access scenario, any medical prac-
titioner is authorized to construct the EHR via the iden-
tities FrankS1, FrankS2, FrankS3 and FrankS4.
These policies will be translated to the XACML policy
language, and then they will be stored in the policies database.
C. EHR Request
Now assume that GP Karen needs to have additional
medical information about her patient Frank to help her to
accurately diagnose his mental illness. However, Karen does
not know whether Frank has other EMRs or not. Therefore,
she asks for Frank’s overall Electronic Health Record, by
sending a request through her medical system using Frank’s
local identity FrankK. The following steps illustrate how this
request to the Electronic Health Record system is processed
(Figure 4):
1) Karen accesses her clinic’s EMR system and gets au-
thenticated.
2) Karen sends an EHR access request for FrankK.
3) Karen’s EMR system replaces Frank’s local iden-
tity FrankK in the EHR request by his associated
pseudonym identifier FrankS2.
4) Karen’s EMR system digitally signs the EHR request
using its PKI key and then sends it to the EHR system.
5) The EHR system forwards the EHR request to the
Access Control function to evaluate it.
6) A log of this EHR request is sent to the audit log server.
7) The Access Control function requests additional at-
tributes (e.g. name, medical role, access context param-
eters) about Karen from Karen’s EMR system.
8) The Access Control function asks the Identity Linkage
function to resolve the received pseudonym identifier
FrankS2 to its associated prime identity.
9) The Identity Linkage function replies with prime identity
FrankP.
10) The Access Control function retrieves the access control
policies associated with prime identity FrankP.
11) The Access Control function evaluates the access request
as per the access control policies.
12) As per Frank’s access control Policy 2 in Section VII-B,
the Access Control function sends a request to the
Identity Linkage function to construct an EHR from
the identities FrankS3 and FrankS4 since Karen is
permitted by Frank to construct the EHR from these
identities.
13) The Identity Linkage function sends a digitally signed
EMR request to the drugs addiction clinic’s EMR system
using Frank’s pseudonym identifier FrankS3 and to
the hospital’s EMR system using Frank’s pseudonym
identifier FrankS4.
14) Each of the drugs addiction clinic’s EMR systems and
the hospital’s EMR system will do the following:
a) Resolve the received pseudonym identifier to its
associated local identity.
b) Evaluate the EMR request as per the local access
control policies.
c) Retrieve the EMR and replace Frank’s local iden-
tity with his associated pseudonym identifier.
d) The resulting EMR is digitally signed using the
EMR system’s PKI key and then sent to the EHR
system.
15) The received EMRs are sent to the Aggregation function
which constructs Frank’s Electronic Health Record.
16) Frank’s pseudonym identifier at Karen’s EMR system
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FrankS2 is set as the identity of this EHR.
17) The resulting EHR is digitally signed using the EHR
system’s PKI key and sent back to Karen’s EMR system.
18) This action is logged with the audit log server.
19) Karen’s EMR system replaces Frank’s pseudonym iden-
tifier FrankS2 with Frank’s local identity FrankK.
20) The aggregated Electronic Health Record is made avail-
able to Karen.
From this process we realize the following benefits:
• Karen has requested Frank’s EHR without knowing
where his EMRs are located which satisfies his privacy
concern in Section VII.
• Frank’s local identity FrankK has not been disclosed
to other healthcare providers which satisfies privacy Re-
quirement 2 in Section II.
• Frank’s access control Policy 2 in Section VII-B has been
satisfied.
• The resulting EHR is an accurate linking of Frank’s
EMRs as he is the one who has established the links
among them, and this satisfies privacy Requirements 1
and 2 in Section II.
D. Emergency Access Protocol
Now assume that Frank has a heart attack and has been
taken to the hospital emergency department that he has vis-
ited before. Emergency Room doctor John needs to access
FrankA’s Electronic Health Record (i.e. Frank’s identity at
the hospital) in order to check Frank’s allergies to medication.
To do this, the EHR request will go through Steps 1 to 20
in Section VII-C. The only difference in this situation is
that the medical authority’s emergency access policy will be
used at Step 11 as the access context is determined to be an
emergency, and the identities that will be sent in Step 12 are
FrankS1, FrankS2 and FrankS3 which, with local identity
FrankS4, allows the EHR to be constructed from all four of
Frank’s pseudonyms.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have presented Electronic Health Record
system protocols that are able to construct an EHR from
different Electronic Medical Records concerning a specific
patient while still respecting the patient’s privacy concerns.
The EMR linking problem is solved by linking the patient’s
local identities through an extension of existing Federated
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Identity Management concepts. This linking process requires
patients to explicitly link all their local identities, which results
in an accurate and secure linking process. In addition to this
result, healthcare providers are able to satisfy patients’ privacy
wishes by not disclosing their local identities to the Electronic
Health Record system either during the linking process or
when servicing an EHR request. Instead, a pseudonym identi-
fier is used within the EHR request. Through the EHR system,
patients are able to set their own preferred access control
policies over their health data, and the medical authority can
ensure that medical records are used in legitimate ways only.
In online healthcare, the availability of Electronic Health
Records is an important requirement especially when we
consider emergency cases. Therefore, most healthcare systems
are implemented using redundancy and fault-tolerance mech-
anisms so as to avoid any interruption to medical services. In
our case, this means that the identity linkage data in the EHR
system needs to be made similarly robust.
A practical issue to be solved is that the Electronic Medical
Record linking process must be done under the assumption that
patients know where their EMRs are located. However, given
that medical data spans entire human lifetimes, it is likely that
most (potential) patients will not even be able to remember
all the medical procedures they have undergone since birth.
Thus, the role of the government’s medical authority in acting
as a trusted and secure ‘brokerage’ service will be critical.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In future healthcare systems, each patient’s medical history
will be provided by an Electronic Health Record system, as
a critical tool for medical diagnosis and research. However,
constructing an Electronic Health Record from isolated Elec-
tronic Medical Records will prove to be a hugely difficult task
in practice. In particular, for patients to maintain trust in such
a system, they must be assured that appropriate mechanisms
are in place to preserve their personal privacy while also
maintaining the integrity of their health data.
Here we have shown that current record and identity linkage
methods are insufficient to satisfy the accuracy and privacy
requirements inherent in Electronic Health Record systems. As
a solution, we have proposed an EHR identity-management
architecture which links the patient’s records indirectly via
pseudonym identifiers. Not only does this produce an accurate
result, as per existing Federated Identity Management tech-
niques, but it can also preserve patients’ privacy wishes.
In future work we plan to integrate this approach with
general access control mechanisms, and to define an identity
management approach for linking entire family trees to allow
diagnosis of, and research into, genetic diseases.
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